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ABSTRACT
Distributed reflective denial of service (DRDoS) attacks are a popular
choice among adversaries. In fact, one of the largest DDoS attacks
ever recorded, reaching a peak of 1.3Tbps against GitHub, was a
memcached-based DRDoS attack. More recently, a record-breaking
2.3Tbps attack against Amazon AWS was due to a CLDAP-based
DRDoS attack. Although reflective attacks have been known for
years, DRDoS attacks are unfortunately still popular and largely
unmitigated.
In this paper,we study in-the-wildDRDoSattacks observed froma
large Internet exchangepoint (IXP) andprovide anumber of security-
relevant measurements and insights. To enable this study, we first
developed IXmon, an open-source DRDoS detection system specifi-
cally designed for deployment at large IXP-likenetwork connectivity
providers and peering hubs. We deployed IXmon at Southern Cross-
roads (SoX), an IXP-likehub thatprovidesbothpeeringandupstream
Internet connectivity services to more than 20 research and educa-
tion (R&E) networks in the South-East United States. In a period of
about 21 months, IXmon detected more than 900 DRDoS attacks to-
wards 31 different victimASes. An analysis of the real-world DRDoS
attacks detected by our system shows that most DRDoS attacks are
short lived, lasting only a fewminutes, but that large-volume, long-
lasting, and highly-distributed attacks against R&E networks are not
uncommon.Wethenuse the results ofouranalysis todiscusspossible
attack mitigation approaches that can be deployed at the IXP level,
before the attack trafficoverwhelms the victim’s network bandwidth.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Large-scaledistributeddenialof service (DDoS)attacksposean immi-
nent threat to the availability of critical Internet-basedoperations [1],
and have become part of sophisticated cyber-warfare arsenals [2].
DDoS attacks can take many different forms [3], and leverage weak-
nesses that span from the application-layer to the physical-layer.
In particular, recent incidents have demonstrated that bandwidth
exhaustionDDoS attacks are capable of bringing down even themost
well-provisioned Internet services, such as highly popular websites
(e.g., Twitter, Netflix, etc.) and cybersecurity services [4–7]. Among
bandwidth exhaustion attacks, distributed reflective denial of service
(DRDoS) attacks are a popular choice among adversaries. In fact,
one of the largest DDoS attacks ever recorded, reaching a peak of
1.3Tbps against GitHub, was a memcached-based DRDoS attack [8].
More recently, a record-breaking 2.3Tbps attack against Amazon
AWSwas due to a CLDAP-based DRDoS attack [9].
Although reflective attacks have been known for years [10] and
could bemitigated in part by filtering/throttling traffic to/from some
UDP services (e.g., filtering memcached traffic at the edge of a net-
work [11]), DRDoS attacks are unfortunately still popular [12] and
largely unmitigated.At the same time,while some information about
DRDoS attacks can be found in blog posts or white papers from se-
curity vendors (e.g., [13]), there is a lack of systematic studies that
provide an in-depth measurement of the properties of in-the-wild
DRDoS attacks, such as occurrence frequency, the distribution of
their sources, duration, volume, targets, and what mitigation steps
could be applied to combat them.
In this paper, we aim to partly fill this gap by studying real-world
DRDoS attacks observed from a large Internet exchange point (IXP)1.
IXPs are high-density peering and connectivity hubs that provide
infrastructure used by autonomous systems (ASes) to interconnect
with eachother (e.g., public or private peering andother connectivity
agreements). Because IXPs provide an increasingly large portion of
the global Internet infrastructure used by ASes to exchange traffic,
they can play a key role in detecting and mitigating DDoS attacks.
To enable this study, we first develop IXmon, an open-source DR-
DoS detection system specifically designed for deployment at large
IXP-like network connectivity providers and peering hubs. While
there exist several DDoS detection and mitigation solutions, such
as traffic scrubbing services [14, 15], these are typically expensive
third-party commercial services. In addition, they are not designed
for detecting DRDoS attacks at IXPs, and are instead more focused
on inline DDoS traffic detection and traffic filtering. On the other
hand, our IXmon system is fully open-source, can be deployed at
large IXPs, and can also be used to enable IXP-based DDoS mitiga-
tions. In fact, IXmon’s goal is not only to detect the occurrence of a
DRDoS attack very early after its inception, but also to identify ASes
that host the reflectors used in the attack. This capability could be
used to enable the filtering of DRDoS attack traffic at the IXP level
before it is routed to the victim, thus preventing the victim’s network
bandwidth from being exhausted.
Figure 1 provides an overview of our IXmon system, whereas
Figure 2 shows an example of how reflected traffic belonging to a
DRDoS attack may traverse an IXP’s fabric to reach the victim net-
work. To detect DRDoS attacks, IXmon takes in input network flow
summaries (e.g., using Cisco’s NetFlow v9 format [16]), which report
flow statistics for all traffic from any source IP to a any destination IP
1Whereas others may define IXPs purely as facilitating public peering among networks,
we refer to IXPs in a broader sense as hubs that facilitate both peering and commercial
connectivity (e.g., transit) services.
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Figure 2: Example of reflection attack trafficflowing through an IXP
that crosses the IXP. Because IXmon aims to detect DRDoS attacks,
we focus on UDP flows whose source port is associated with ser-
vices that can be abused for amplification attacks, such as DNS, NTP,
memcached, CLDAP, etc. [10] (see Section 3 for a complete list). Given
a specific service (e.g., memcached), we then aggregate all related
UDP flows directed to each destination AS and compute the overall
traffic volume of all flows belonging to the same (service,dstAS)
pair. We update these aggregate flow statistics in an online fash-
ion at regular (small) time intervals, and perform online time series
anomaly detection to detect highly anomalous increases in traffic
volume. Finally, every time an anomalous traffic volume increase is
detected for a (service,dstAS) pair, we pass this information to the
DRDoS detection module, which applies additional checks to filter
out possible false positives and only issue an alert for events that are
highly likely associated with actual DRDoS attacks. Additionally,
the DRDoS detection module identifies the source ASes involved in
an attack, and ranks them according to the attack traffic volume they
contribute. By knowing theUDP source port number, the destination
AS (i.e., the victim network), and the source ASes that contribute
the highest amount of attack traffic, an IXP could then deploy traf-
fic filtering rules to mitigate the attack in its very early stages. In
fact, this filtering rule deployment process could be automated by
automatically deriving BGPFlowSpec rules [17] from IXmon’s alerts.
We have deployed IXmon at Southern Crossroads (SoX) [18], an
IXP-like hub that provides both peering and upstream Internet con-
nectivity services to more than 20 research and education (R&E)
networks in the South-East United States. In a period of about 21
months, IXmon detected more than 900 DRDoS attacks towards 31
different victim ASes. In Section 4, we study the characteristics of
these attacks and present a number of insights regarding their dura-
tion and intensity, what services aremost abused, what networks are
more often targeted, and whether the victim networks took action
to mitigate the attacks.
In summary, we make the following contributions:
• We present IXmon, an open-source DRDoS detection system
specifically designed to be deployed at large IXP-like peering
and connectivity hubs. IXmon uses online time series anom-
aly detection and traffic analysis methods to detect both the
victims and sources of real-world DRDoS attacks.
• We deploy IXmon at a large IXP-like R&E peering and con-
nectivity hub located in the South-East United Sates for a
period of about 21months, wherewe detected a large number
and variety of real-world DRDoS attacks in near real time.
• We analyze the real-world DRDoS attacks detected by our
system and report a number of security-relevant measure-
ments and insights. For instance, we show that most DRDoS
attacks are short lived, lasting only a few minutes, but that
large-volume, long-lasting, and highly-distributed attacks
against R&E networks are not uncommon.
2 BACKGROUNDON IXPS
IXPs have been traditionally established as infrastructures that pri-
marily offer peering services. The primary role of an IXP is to serve
as a physical exchange point to facilitate the exchange of Internet
traffic between different autonomous systems (ASes). The minimum
number of ASes that interconnect at an IXP should be at least three
and there must be a clear and open policy for other ASes to join [19].
The ASes interconnect through a shared switching fabric that the
IXPs offer. This interconnection infrastructure can vary widely in
complexity. Some infrastructures can be very simple and minimal
(as a single switch), or very complex (as a large scale distributed
infrastructure that includes remote peering) [20].
Since their initial establishment, the role of IXPshas beenevolving
along with their offered services. Some services are offered as free
value-added services and others are paid services. Many IXPs offer
both public peering and private peering, multi-lateral and bi-lateral
peering, data center services, multiple network management and
other services including route servers, SDN-based network manage-
ment, traffic engineering, and traffic blackholing.
IXPs have been recently further evolving towards becoming ma-
jor peering and connectivity hubs, claiming a central role as part of
the Internet’s core infrastructures [21–23]. There are currentlymore
than 500 IXPs worldwide. Both their membership growth and the
traffic growth show their dynamic and evolving role in the Internet
ecosystem. Some of the largest IXPs have more than 700 members,
while they carry as much traffic as some of the largest global Tier-1
ISPs. In this work, we refer to IXPs in this latter broader sense, as
exchange points in which multiple ASes peer with each other and
can connect to upstream Internet connectivity services.
3 IXMON SYSTEM
In this section, we describe how IXmon’s components work, follow-
ing the high-level overview shown in Figure 1.
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Approach Overview: Given the traffic towards a specific AS,A, to
detect DRDoS attacks againstAwe look for the following factors:
(1) Focus on traffic coming from a UDP source port typically
associated with a service that can be abused for attack ampli-
fication.
(2) For each of those source ports, has the traffic volume towards
A increased in a highly anomalous way?
(3) Is the anomalous traffic distributed across several contribut-
ing source ASes?
As an example, assume that a destination ASA usually receives
very low amounts of traffic from source port UDP 123, which is typ-
ically associated with the NTP service. Wemonitor all traffic from
port UDP 123 that flows towardsA through the IXP’s fabric. All of
a sudden, at time t we detect a spike in incoming NTP traffic, and
notice that several different source AS numbers are contributing in a
coordinatedway to this traffic spike. This scenariomeets the “recipe”
for a DRDoS attack, which IXmon aims to detect automatically. In
the following, we explain how we translate the above high-level
approach into a concrete DRDoS detection system.
3.1 Aggregate Traffic Statistics
IXmon is designed tomonitor network traffic at large real-world IXP-
like peering and connectivity hubs.Due to the sheer amount of traffic
observed from such a vantage point, efficiency is a high priority goal.
In particular, memory consumption is a main concern, given the
large amount of network traffic statistics that we need to track over
all possible targets and sources of DRDoS attacks visible from an
IXP. To this end, our first step is to condense detailed information
about network flows crossing the IXP into traffic sketches containing
aggregate traffic statistics.
IXmon receivesnetworkflowstatistics as input.Whileourcurrent
implementation supports and has been tested only onCiscoNetFlow
versions 9 and 10 [24], it is designed to also support other formats,
including sFlow [25]. For simplicity, in the following we will simply
use the termflow to refer to a network flow inNetFlow format.While
NetFlow flows include many details about how the related network
packets traversed the IXP (e.g., including the network interfaces
involved in routing the flow), we will only refer to the properties
that are used by our system.
Let the tuple
fi = (srcIPi ,srcPorti ,dstIPi ,dstPorti ,protocoli ,packetsi ,bytesi )
represent a network flow, where packetsi and bytesi represent the
number of packets and overall number of bytes sent from the source
to the destination IPs/ports that have been “captured” by flow fi .
The IXP collects all flows crossing its infrastructure2 and sends them
to IXmon in a stream (flows are sent out when they are closed by a
FIN packet, in case of TCP, or after a configurable timeout managed
by the IXP operators). IXmonmines this stream of traffic flows to
detect DRDoS attacks in near real time.
Given our focus on DRDoS attacks, we keep only flows whose
protocol is UDP and whose source port is related to a service that
is known to be vulnerable to be used for attack amplification. The
set of source port numbers and related UDP services we use in our
2The IXP implements a uniform packet sampling policy to reduce load on its routers.
current configuration of IXmon is inspired by previouswork [10, 26]
and listed in Table 1.
Table 1: List ofmonitored UDP source ports
Service Port
Bandwidth
Amplification
Factor
DNS 53 28 to 54
NTP 123 556.9
CLDAP 389 56 to 70
CharGen 19 358.8
Memcached 11211 10,000 to 51,000
SunRPC 111 7 to 28
SSDP 1900 30.8
SNMP 161 6.3
SRCDS 27005 -
Call of Duty 20800 -
NETBIOS 137 3.8
RIP 520 131.24
Quake 27960 63.9
Steam 29015 5.5
QOTD 17 140.3
To analyze the continuous large stream of UDP flows received
by IXmon, we proceed as follows. First, IXmon partitions time into
intervals of fixed length ∆t (one minute, in our experiments). Given
the set of all flows received during an interval ∆t , we map srcIP and
dstIP to their respective AS numbers, srcAS and dstAS (e.g., using
RouteViews data [27]). This gives us flows of the form:
Fi (t)= (srcASi ,srcPorti ,dstASi ,dstPorti ,packetsi (t),bytesi (t))
where t indicates the start of a time interval ∆t , protocol is omitted
since it is constant (always UDP), and the packets and bytes counts
vary in timewhile the other flowparameters are fixed for a given sub-
script index. Then, given a time interval ∆t , we aggregate all flows
Fi (t) that share the same source port and destination AS numbers,
and sum up all of their bytes. More formally, we obtain aggregate
sketch flows of this form:
Ak (t)= (srcPortk ,dstASk ,bytesk (t))
wherebytesk (t) is the sumof the byte counts contributed by all flows
aggregated intoAk (t).
Notice that, given a fixed pair of source port, srcPortk , and des-
tination AS, dstASk , the related AS-level flowsAk (t) give us a time
series of the total traffic volume (i.e., bytesk (t)) flowing through the
IXP that originated from srcPortk (from any source IP) and destined
towards dstASk (to any destination IP belonging to that AS and any
destination UDP port). Also, while not represented in the above
sketch, for simplicity, we keep track of the contribution (in terms of
total bytes) to flowAk (t) of each srcASi whose traffic is aggregated
into the sketch.
3.2 Online Time Series Anomaly Detection
Given a stream of flow sketchesAk (t) related to a (srcPortk ,dstASk )
pair, we detect anomalous increases in traffic volume by performing
an online analysis of the time series represented by bytesk (t).
Specifically, we maintain a time series model consisting of an
exponentially-weighted moving average and variance [28], as fol-
lows:
µ(t)=α ·µ(t−1)+(1−α)·b(t) (1)
σ 2(t)= (1−α)·(σ 2(t)+α ·(b(t)−µ(t−1))2) (2)
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whereα is a constant andwherewe omitted the subscriptk and used
b(t) in place of bytesk (t), for brevity.
Then, given the moving average, µk (t), and variance σ 2k (t) com-
puted at time t forAk (t), we compute an anomaly (or deviation) score
as:
δk (t)=max
(
0,bk (t)−(µk (t)+θ ·σk (t))
bk (t)+ε
)
(3)
where θ is a tunable parameter (set to 3 in our experiments) and ε
is a small constant (e.g., 10−6) that is only needed to avoid division
by zero. Essentially, δk (t) tells us howmuch bk (t) deviates (on the
positive side) from the moving average plus a tolerance factor pro-
portional to the standard deviation. Notice that δk (t) ∈ [0,1], which
we use as an anomaly score. The larger δk (t), the more strongly
the current reading ofAk ’s traffic volume, bk (t), deviates from the
expected value plus some tolerance that takes natural variations into
account. If δk (t)>τ , where τ is a tunable detection threshold (set to
0.5 in our experiments), we say that the current reading of the traffic
volume for the flows aggregated byAk is anomalous.
Additional details: At every new time interval, we use Equations 1
and 2 to update our time series model. However, once an anomaly
is detected, we stop updating the model until the new traffic volume
measurements go back to pre-anomaly levels.More formally, assume
td is the first time in which an anomaly is detected, we do not use
the newmeasurement at time td to compute µ(td +1) and σ 2(td +1).
Now, let
δk (t+n,t)=max
(
0,bk (t+n)−(µk (t)+θ ·σk (t))
bk (t+n)+ε
)
(4)
and td = t + 1. In other words, at the time when the anomaly is
detected, n = 1. At the next time slot, n = 2, we compare the latest
measurement of the traffic volume bk (t+n) to the time series model
that was last updated at time t . If δk (t+n,t)>τ this means that the
anomalous traffic is still present at time t +n, and we continue to
keep the same model computed at time t . Let us now assume that at
n=m the anomalous levels of traffic revert back to normal. Namely,
δk (t +m,t) ≤ τ . Then, we use bk (t +m) to update the values of µk
and σk and keep updating the model at the following time intervals,
until another anomaly is identified.
This approach of updating the average and standard deviation
only during “normal times” allows us tomore easily determinewhen
a traffic volume anomaly, which may represent a DRDoS attack,
starts and ends. Specifically, in the example above we can determine
that the anomaly started at time t+1 and ended at time t+m.
3.3 Attack Detection
Let nowAk (t) be a traffic sketch time series, and assume that td is the
time interval inwhich a time series anomaly has been detected using
the approach described in Section 3.2. To detect DRDoS attacks and
filter out possible traffic volume anomalies unrelated to reflection
attacks, we introduce two additional conditions:
• Minimum traffic volume: Given the last aggregate traffic vol-
ume measurement, bk (td ), we discard the detected anomaly
if bk (td )<ν (in our experiments we set ν to 5Mbps). The rea-
son is that if the aggregate traffic volume is very low, either
the anomaly is not caused by an attack, or the effects of the
attack on the target AS’s bandwidth are negligible and can be
ignored.
• Source AS volume entropy: Since we focus on DRDoS attacks,
we expect the anomalous traffic volume increase to be dis-
tributed across multiple reflectors located in different source
ASes.
To compute the source AS volume entropy, we first consider the
set of source ASes whose traffic is aggregated intoAk , and take into
account the overall number of bytes sent from each of this sources
ASes toAk ’s destination AS (i.e., the potential victim network). Let
Sk (td )= {s1,s2,...,sn } represents the set of traffic volume amounts
contributed by each source AS at time td . We then normalize each el-
ement in the set as s ′i =
si∑n
j=1sj
. Finally,we treat s ′i as the probability of
“observing” the i-th sourceASas contributor toAk ’s aggregate traffic,
and compute the entropyH(S ′k (td )) of the set S ′k (td )= {s ′1,s ′2,...,s ′n }.
If H(S ′k (td )) = 1, it means that the traffic from port srcPortk to
dstASk is evenly distributed across the contributing source ASes. On
the other hand, low values ofH(S ′k (td ))mean thatmost of the traffic
is contributed by only one (or very few) source ASes. Therefore,
we set a thresholdh so that traffic volume anomalies are labeled as
DRDoS attacks only whenH(S ′k (td ))>h (in our experiments, we
useh=0.4).
All time series anomalies detected based on the algorithm de-
scribed in Section 3.2 that also meet the two above conditions are
labeled as DRDoS attacks. Correspondingly, a DRDoS attack alert is
issued, which contains all details of the attack asmeasured at time td ,
including the destination AS number, source port, current aggregate
attack volume, and distribution of traffic amounts from the contribut-
ing source ASes. A new alert is issued for every new time interval
td +n for which the attack is sustained, allowing a network operator
to identify whether the attack is still ongoing or has terminated
(when no new alert is issued). On the other hand, time series anom-
alies that do not pass the checks discussed above are logged and can
be sent to network operators but are not labeled as DRDoS attacks.
4 ANALYSIS OF IN-THE-WILDATTACKS
In this section we provide some background information about SoX,
describe howwe setup and deployed IXmon at SoX, and present our
measurements and analysis of the in-the-wild DRDoS attacks we
detected during our deployment period. Notice that in the follow-
ing analysis we anonymize all AS numbers related to autonomous
systems involved in the detected DRDoS attacks, as some of this
information may be sensitive (e.g., some of SoX’s members may
not want to publicly disclose how many attacks their network re-
ceived and if/how they mitigated them). For instance, we replace AS
10490 with a consistent but randomly chosen identifier of the form
“Anon.XXX” (where XXX is a positive integer).
4.1 IXmon Implementation and Setup
We implemented IXmon’s flow parsing and traffic aggregation mod-
ules inC++, leveraginganopen-source toolsnamedFastNetMon[29].
FastNetMon is a DDoS detection systemmainly geared towards en-
terprise networks. Unfortunately, we found that the attack detection
approach used by FastNetMon was not designed to detect and track
DRDoS attacks related to many possible large networks and involv-
ing large numbers of source ASes, making it completely unusable in
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Figure 3: Networks reachable from the Internet through SoX (AS 10490). Directed edges represent a customer->provider relationship.
our deployment scenario. Therefore,whilewe leveraged andadapted
the NetFlow parsingmodule of FastNetMon, we designed and imple-
mented our own IXP-focused online time series anomaly detection
and DRDoS detection algorithms using Python (we plan to share
IXmon’s code on GitHub after publication).
As explained in Section 3, IXmon’s online anomaly detection and
DRDoS detection algorithms include a few tunable parameters. It
is worth noting that our main objective for developing IXmonwas
to enable the study of in-the-wild attacks. Because sizable ground
truth datasets of in-the-wild DRDoS attacks are very difficult to
come by (we are not aware of any publicly available dataset of this
kind), to tune the parameters we rely on domain knowledge and a
manual analysis of IXmon’s logs during the preliminary phases of
our deployment. In general, we take a conservative approach that
favors minimizing possible false detections.While this may cause us
to miss some smaller (i.e., lower volume and duration), more subtle
DRDoS attacks, these attacks are unlikely to have a large impact on
their target networks.
We set the length of the time interval for traffic aggregation∆t =1
minute. This interval is long enough to accumulate sufficient aggre-
gate data from the stream of flows related to each (srcPortk ,dstASk )
pair and to compute meaningful traffic sketches, and at the same
time it enables near real-time DRDoS detection.
In Equation 3, we set the parameter θ = 3. Essentially, θ con-
trols how much the traffic volume can deviate from the mean, be-
fore an anomaly is detected. The value of θ = 3 is quite conser-
vative, and is inspired by the fact that for Gaussian distributions
Pr (µ−3σ ≤X ≤ µ+3σ )≈99.73%. In addition, we set the anomaly de-
tection thresholdτ =0.5. In otherwords,we tune the system todetect
large anomalies, as compared to historic traffic volumes modeled by
themovingaverage and standarddeviations.While thismaycauseus
to miss small (i.e., low volume) attacks, it makes sure that the anom-
alies we detect are in fact highly likely related to attacks. This is fur-
ther reinforced by the additional constraints explained in Section 3.3.
As for the parameters defined in Section 3.3, we set ν = 5Mbps
because DRDoS attacks whose peak traffic is lower are unlikely to
cause much disruption to institutional networks (such networks
typically have Internet connectivity bandwidth ranging from hun-
dreds of Mbps to tens of Gbps). Finally we set the source AS entropy
thresholdh=0.4. We tuned this threshold based on a data collected
during a preliminary deployment of IXmon, and is meant to capture
attacks whose traffic is fairly distributed across multiple sources,
rather than all coming mostly from one single source AS.
An additional “operational” parameter is related to the packet
sampling rate used by the network operator that provides the raw
flows. In IXmon, we take the sampling rate into account, and adjust
our traffic measurements accordingly (e.g., we adjust the average
traffic volume measured per minute of observation).
4.2 Data Collection at SoX
As mentioned earlier, we deployed IXmon at a large IXP called
SoX (AS 10490) that provides peering and Internet connectivity
services to several research and education networks. Specifically,
based on public data provided on AS-to-AS relationships provided
by CAIDA [30, 31], SoX has more than 20 direct customer networks
(also called the IXPmembers or participants), peerswith 9 other large
ASes, and is connected to 5upstreamproviders, as shown inFigure 14
(in appendix). Furthermore, SoX serves as upstream provider for a
variety of smaller ASes that are reachable through it from the rest
of the Internet, as shown in Figure 3. While our deployment is still
ongoing, this study is based on data collected between April,2018
- April,2020 (due to interruptions due to operational reasons, our
trafficmonitoring was only active during part of this time period).
Overall, we collected traffic information for 634 days. During this
period, the source/destination traffic crossing the IXP’s fiber was
related to a total of 5212 different autonomous systems.
4.3 AttackMeasurements and Analysis
In this section, we present a detailed analysis of the DRDoS attacks
detected by IXmon to understand their behavior and gain insights
that could prove useful for mitigating future attacks.
As an example of the attacks that are included in the analysis
provided below, Figure 4 shows a snapshot of three different DR-
DoS attacks detected by IXmon. The x axis show that time window
withinwhich the attack occurred (including a duration of 30minutes
prior to and after the attack), whereas they axis shows the volume
of traffic contributed by each source AS involved in the attack (the
graph is limited to the top 10 sourceASes by volume). Each line in the
graph represents the traffic sent to the victimAS from a single source
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Figure 4: Examples of DrDoS attacks detected by IXmon
AS. For instance, Figure 4a shows a DRDoS attack that leverages the
CLDAP service (source port 389) directed towards AS Anon.2371.
The aggregate traffic for the attack, which sums the contribution of
all source ASes that sent traffic to AS Anon.2371 from UDP port 389
reached a peak of ≈210Mbps. It is interesting to notice that before
and after the attack there was little or no traffic sent by those source
ASes to the destinationAS fromport 389. Then, all of a sudden all the
source ASes start sending high volumes of traffic in a coordinated
way, which is a telltale sign of an ongoing DRDoS attack. After all,
inter-AS CLDAP use is rarely needed or justified, and it is therefore
natural to have very low or no inter-AS CLDAP traffic outside of DR-
DoS attacks. In addition, having many source ASes sending CLDAP
traffic to a common destination AS would be quite a big coincidence
for this to be explained by normal activities.
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(b) Attack duration
Figure 5: Distribution of peak attack volumes and durations
4.3.1 Volume and Duration. While large DDoS attacks have caught
the attention of bloggers and news media, there is limited publicly
available data on the overall distribution and characteristics of in-
the-wild DRDoS attacks (some information can be found in a 2017
blog post by Cloudflare [13]).
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Figure 6: Number of attack instances per (reflection) source port
To better understand in-the-wild DRDoS attacks, we analyze the
characteristics of all attacks detected by IXmon. Specifically, during
ourdeploymentperiod IXmondetected 987 attacks.Weuse this large
number of attacks to measure the distribution of the volume and du-
rationof in-the-wildDRDoSattacks,which are reported in Figures 5a
and 5b. It can be seen that most of the observed attacks (≈80%) have
a duration of less than 10 minutes, whereas the median peak attack
volume is less than 20Mbps. Overall, only ≈8% of the attacks reach a
peakvolumeofmore than100Mbpswitha fewattacks reachingpeaks
above 1Gbps (the highest attack volume we observed was 1.5Gbps).
4.3.2 Services Abused for Attack Amplification. IXmon monitors
traffic from the UDP ports listed in Table 1. However, only some of
these ports were used in DRDoS attacks visible from SoX. Figure 6
shows the distribution of source ports (ab)used for reflecting traffic
against DRDoS victims, with the y axis showing the number of
attacks in which a given port was used. As can be seen, CLDAP (port
389) appears to be the most abused service for attack amplification,
followed by DNS (port 53) and NTP (port 123). Figure 7 reports a
boxplot showing the distribution of peak attack volume per port
(the red line represents the median, while the red square shows the
average value). This shows that some CLDAP-based attacks reached
peak volumes above 1Gbps.
4.3.3 Multi-VectorAttacks. DRDoS attacks can be launched by abus-
ingmore thanoneUDPserviceata time.Currently, IXmon separately
tracks traffic from a given source port and detects DRDoS attacks
independently for each abused service.However, attackers can abuse
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Figure 7: Distribution of attack volume per (reflection) source port
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Figure 8: Example of amulti-vector attack
multiple services at the same to increase the number of reflectors
to be aimed against the victim and thus further amplify the attack
bandwidth. To analyze these attacks in our alerts dataset, we can
easily retrieve DRDoS attacks related to individual source ports that
have a common destination AS and that overlap in time. By doing so,
we found 36multi-vector attack instances (out of 987) involvingup to
4 different source ports simultaneously. Figure 8 shown an example
of attack detected using IXmon that simultaneously leverages NTP
(port 123) and CLDAP (port 389) to reflect the attack traffic towards
ASAnon.2354.A coordinated surge in trafficvolume can be observed
from both source ports, clearly indicating a multi-vector attack.
4.3.4 Distribution of Reflectors. DRDoS attacks are executed by
exploiting a (at times large) number of publicly reachable reflection
servers. In this section, we analyze where reflected attack traffic
originates from.
Figure 9 shows the distribution of the number of different source
ASes that contribute to each attack. Themedian is 40, indicating that
at least half of all attacks are highly distributed acrossmany different
source networks that are themselves abused to reflect and amplify
attack traffic. InFigure10weshowthedistributionofpeak trafficcon-
tributed to different attacks by the top 10 source ASes (ranked based
on the number of DRDoS attacks each source AS participates to). As
can be seen, the median (red line) peak volume for reflected traffic
from each AS is relatively limited, typically around≈1Mbps, though
there are also significant outliers with high peak traffic volumes.
Either way, when combining together all contributing source ASes
the attacks these ASes facilitate can easily reach hundreds of Mbps.
To analyze the geographical distribution of the networks where
reflection servers reside, we plot the location of the source ASes that
contributed to the DRDoS attacks detected by IXmon. To map the
geolocation of a given AS we first obtain the prefixes owned by the
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Figure 9: Distribution of number of source ASes involved in attacks
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Figure 10: Distribution of peak traffic volume contributed by the top
10 Source ASes in Attacks
AS, based on BGP traffic from the day before the AS participated in
an attack.Next,we select a random IP address belonging to one of the
prefixes andmap the IP address to its geolocation via a IP geolocation
API [32]. While this is only an approximate method for determining
the geolocation of an AS (some AS numbers span multiple regions),
it serves the purpose of giving an idea of how geographically dis-
tributed the reflectors typically are. As an example, Figure 11 shows
the geolocation of both destinationASes (i.e., the victims) and source
ASes (i.e., the networks that host the servers abused for attack re-
flection and amplification) related to NTP-based attacks detected by
IXmon. Naturally, given the fact that SoX serves as a peering and
connectivity hub for research and education networks in the South-
East USA, the destination ASes are clustered in that region. It is easy
to see that the sources ofNTP traffic are distributedwidely across the
world.This is evidently anomalous, in that innormal (i.e., non-attack)
cases the vastmajority ofNTP responseswould be coming fromNTP
servers that aregeographically closer to the the requesting IPaddress.
Combined with the fact that no NTP requests are sent from a victim
AS to those reflection servers, this lack of “locality” could be used
as a way to develop an attack mitigation strategy (see Section 4.4).
4.4 AttackMitigation
In this section, we analyze whether the operators of the victim net-
works attempted to mitigate the attacks that were detected by IX-
mon. Specifically, we focus on mitigations that require BGP actions
(explained below). Afterwards, we discuss how IXmon could help
mitigate future attacks by (a) detecting DRDoS attacks in near real
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Figure 11: Geo-locations of source and destination ASes for
NTP-based DRDoS attacks
time (with a delay of about ∆t =1minute); (b) determining the AS
being targeted by the attack and what service (i.e., source UDP port)
is being abused to reflect/amplify attack traffic; and (b) identifying
the source ASes that contribute the most to the attack, so that attack
traffic originating from those ASes can be filtered out.
4.4.1 Mitigation Strategies. : Multiple ways exist to respond to
DDoS attacks [33]. However, as we focus on bandwidth exhaus-
tion DRDoS attacks, we ignore mitigations implemented locally at
the victim network. Instead, we focus on mitigations that are im-
plemented upstream, with the help of third-party networks such as
traffic providers or scrubbing centers, and that make use of BGP to
drop or redirect traffic before it reaches the victim network:
• Blackholing: BGP-based blackholing redirects all traffic to-
wards a victimAS (both legitimate andmalicious traffic) into a
null interface, or “blackhole.” Althoughmultiple variations of
blackholingexist, theyareprimarily achievedbyadjusting the
next-hop attribute and BGP communities in BGP announce-
ments [34]. The next-hop method involves the trigger source
sending a BGP update to the edge routers with the next-hop
attribute set to an IP address that is pre-configured to a null in-
terface. Themost commonly used next-hop IP for blackholing
is 192.0.2.1, which is reserved by IANA for test networks [35].
• Traffic re-routing: In thismethod, all traffic towards the victim
network is redirected to third-party services, such as a traffic
scrubbing center that is capable of detecting and dropping
DDoS attack traffic. Then, legitimate traffic is forwarded back
to the original destination (i.e., the victim AS). To re-route
traffic, a BGP announcement can be issued by the scrubbing
center AS taking ownership of the victim’s targeted IP pre-
fixes, essentially performing an authorized BGP hijacking.
After these BGP announcements propagate, all traffic des-
tined to the victim AS will instead reach the scrubbing center.
After the attack has ended, another BGP messages can be
issued to reinstate the original IP prefix ownership and again
route all traffic to the true destination.
4.4.2 Detecting BGP-based DRDoSMitigations. To detect whether
mitigations were put into place to counter the attacks detected by
IXmon, we perform an analysis of BGP announcements related to
the victim ASes before, during and after a DRDoS attack occurrence.
To this end, we leverage routing information from RouteViews [27],
as explained below:
• Blackholing: To detect the use of blackholing mitigations, we
monitor the BGP updates involving all IP prefixes owned by
a victim AS, and check if any of these updates announce the
next-hop to be 192.0.2.1. In addition, we look for BGP updates
with a community value set to 666, which is commonly used
to implement balckholing [34].
• Traffic re-routing: To detect cases in which traffic is re-routed
to a third-party AS (e.g., to a scrubbing center), we gather
all BGP updates made around a DRDoS attack time window
and consider all updates related to IPs that fall within the
victim’s network ownership. Then, for each such BGP update,
we check if the origin AS (extracted from RIB records) has
changed, compared to before the attack (e.g., compared to
the previous day) . If the origin AS in the BGP updates ob-
served during the attack does not match the previously seen
origin AS, we mark this as a temporary change in ownership,
and check whether future BGPmessages also show another
change of AS ownership from the third-party AS back to
the previous origin AS. We implement this approach using
PyBGPStream library and Routeview data.
BGP
Announcement
(origin_change)
Figure12:ExampleofDRDoSattackandtrafficre-routingmitigation
4.4.3 Measuring In-the-WildMitigations. Using theBGP-basedanal-
ysis explained earlier, we measure whether a mitigation effort was
deployed for the DRDoS attacks detected by IXmon. With respect
to mitigating attacks via traffic re-routing traffic, we found 56 BGP
relevant announcements that occurred during 3 different DRDoS
attacks. These BGP announcements effectively changed the origin
AS of IP prefixes owned by the victim network and redirected traffic
to a known traffic scrubbing provider. All of these mitigation efforts
were related to attacks directed towards AS Anon.2354 , with traffic
being re-routed to the AS Anon.1890. All 3 attacks for which miti-
gation was deployed had a duration greater than 30 minutes. With
respect to mitigation via BGP-based blackholing, we did not find
any evidence that blackholing was used for remediating any of the
DRDoS attacks we detected.
Figure 12 shows an example of DRDoS attack for which a traffic
rerouting mitigation was implemented. As can be seen, in this case
the attack had been ongoing for around 45 minutes, before traffic
was re-routed to a scrubbing center. Traffic re-routing is identified
by the BGP announcements to change origin (as seen in Figure 12)
of the victim prefix to scrubbing center’s AS Anon.1890.
While it was a bit surprising that only 3 attacks and only one
network operator used attack mitigation, personal communications
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with the SoX operators confirmed that only that one member net-
work made use of a DDoS mitigation plan available to all of SoX’s
customers/members. Another surprising observation is that only
long-lived attacks are considered for mitigation. It is possible that
one of the main issue is that currently DDoS detection happens
“manually,” once the attack has started to cause noticeable disrup-
tion and perhaps network users start complaining to the operators.
Our IXmon system can reduce such detection delay significantly,
by performing DRDoS attack detection in near real time with an
inexpensive open-source solution.
4.4.4 Improving Attack Mitigation at IXPs. While re-routing traffic
to third-party scrubbing services is a commonly used strategy for
mitigating DDoS attacks, it can become a quite expensive depending
on the size and duration of the attack that a victim is trying to defend
against. Another possibility for mitigation is to rely on IXPs and up-
stream ISPs to implement traffic blackholing. However, as explained
earlier, currently blackholing is either an “all or nothing” or very
coarsely selective strategy that can cause significant collateral dam-
age [36, 37], because it filters out both legitimate and attack traffic. In
this section, we discuss how IXmon could enable IXPs to help their
customer/members who fall victim of DRDoS attacks, by making
trafficblackholingmore “surgical” so that only trafficassociatedwith
specific services and with specific attack-contributing source ASes
is blocked. This has the potential of significantly reducing collateral
damage.
The strategywepropose is the following. LetV be the victimASof
aDRDoS attack detected by IXmon,p be the source UDP port abused
for reflecting attack traffic towardsV , and S = {s1,s2,...,sn } be the set
of source ASes that send traffic from port p toV during the attack.
The IXP could implement a filtering rule that only blocks all traffic
from each source AS si and port p directed towardsV . Because all
information necessary to create these filtering rules is contained in
IXmon’s DRDoS alerts, it would be possible to simply automatically
translate each alert into a BGP Flowspec rule that can be propagated
to the IXP’s routers, so that the time to implement the mitigation
strategy is greatly reduced, compared to manual intervention.
To understand what is the potential impact to the above mitiga-
tion strategy, we investigate the extent of the “collateral damage”
(i.e., blocked non-DRDoS traffic) a target network may incur. To this
end, let us consider the traffic measurements shown in Figure 13.
Each heatmap corresponds to one of the UDP source ports reported
in Figure 6, fromwhich we observed at least one DRDoS attack. All
six heatmaps are related to one single destination AS, which we
select as the AS number for which we observed the largest number
of distinct DRDoS attacks, during IXmon’s deployment period. The
x axis reports a period of 30 consecutive days of traffic monitoring,
whereas they axis reports a randomly selected set of 20 source ASes.
These source ASes were selected among all source ASes that during
the 30 days period in the x axis sent at least some traffic from any of
the six source UDP ports. The color of each heatmap cells indicates
the total number of MBytes sent by a source AS to the destination
AS during each day. Gray cells indicate zero bytes, whereas other
cell colors indicated the “intensity” of the daily traffic. From all these
graphs we exclude attack traffic detected by IXmon. The reason is
that we want to highlight the volume of normal (i.e., non-DRDoS
attack) traffic typically sent by any source AS to a destination AS,
as seen from the vantage point of an IXP.
Let us consider first Figure 13a, which is related to CLDAP traffic
(port 389). As we can see, it is rare to observe any inter-AS traffic for
this service.Thismakes sense, in thatCLDAPisprimarilymeantasan
authentication protocol to be used within a local network. Similarly,
ports 19, 111, and11211 areunlikely to beused for legitimate inter-AS
communication purposes. Therefore, blocking inter-AS traffic from
these ports at the IXP level is unlikely to cause much collateral dam-
ageat all. Services suchasNTP (port 123) andDNS (port 53)haveadif-
ferent traffic profile. Inter-AS traffic in these cases is not uncommon,
though the overall volume can be quite low, and therefore traffic fil-
tering can produce some observable collateral damage. For example,
filteringall sourceport53 traffictowardsadestinationASmay impact
DNS resolutions for domains whose authoritative name servers are
locatedwithin the destinationAS.However, let us assume IXmon de-
tects an attack related to one of these ports/services.ABGPFlowspec
rule automatically derived from IXmon’sDRDoSalertwould suggest
that the IXP filter all traffic coming from the identified attack source
port directed to the victim network. In addition the filtering rule
would specifywhat sourceASes are contributing to theattack, so that
the IXP could block only traffic from a specific source port and a spe-
cific subset of source ASes, thus further limiting possible collateral
damage. Furthermore, filtering could be limited to the duration of the
attack.As soonas IXmondetects that theDRDoSattack is over, a new
BGPFlowspec rule couldbe issuedso that the IXPwouldstopfiltering
any traffic towards the target AS. This approach could help IXPs pro-
tect their downstream customer/member networks from bandwidth
exhaustion DRDoS attacks with minimal collateral damage.
5 RELATEDWORK
In this sectionwearepresentingpriorwork in theareaofDDoSdetec-
tion and mitigation both in the context of IXPs and large Tier-1 ISPs.
Detection: Sekar et al. [38] proposes LADS, a multi-stage flow
collection and monitoring infrastructure for DDoS detection at Tier-
1 ISPs that relies on SNMP and Netflow feeds from routers. Unlike
LADS, we propose an open-source detection system designed to be
deployed at an IXP to detect and measuring DRDoS attacks. The
specific detection approach using by IXmon is also different from
LADS, as it relies on a combination of online time series anomaly
detection and DRDoS-specific features to minimize possible false
alerts.
Rossow et al. [10] report on the abuse of amplification protocols
in DRDoS attacks in a large ISP. This work mainly focuses on the
abuse of legitimate amplifiers in the wild and proposes mitigation
techniques that should be deployed at the amplifier level. On the
other hand, we focus on building an open-source DRDoS detection
system that can help IXPs in themitigation of DRDoS attacks against
their customer/member networks.
Hsieh and Chan [39] propose a neural networks approach to de-
tect DDoS attacks. They rely on network features such as number of
packets, number of bytes, time interval variance, packet rate and bit
rate. Similarly, [40] proposes to detect DDoS attacks based on Naive
Bayes and Random Forest trees. The drawback of these approaches
is that they are not designed for real-time traffic analysis and de-
ployment at large IXPs. Furthermore, they require large volumes
Karthika Subramani, Roberto Perdisci, andMaria Konte
Da
y 0
Da
y 5
Da
y 1
0
Da
y 1
5
Da
y 2
0
Da
y 2
5
Da
y 3
0
2020-01-01 - 2020-02-01
Anon.2577
Anon.2591
Anon.2596
Anon.4680
Anon.5148
Anon.3710
Anon.370
Anon.521
Anon.844
Anon.895
Anon.1609
Anon.1959
Anon.1462
Anon.258
Anon.3769
Anon.1138
Anon.1157
Anon.2751
Anon.3581
Anon.4501
So
ur
ce
 A
S
dstAS : Anon.2354 - srcPort : 389
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
In
co
m
in
g 
Tr
af
fic
 in
 M
B
(a) CLDAP
Da
y 0
Da
y 5
Da
y 1
0
Da
y 1
5
Da
y 2
0
Da
y 2
5
Da
y 3
0
2020-01-01 - 2020-02-01
Anon.2577
Anon.2591
Anon.2596
Anon.4680
Anon.5148
Anon.3710
Anon.370
Anon.521
Anon.844
Anon.895
Anon.1609
Anon.1959
Anon.1462
Anon.258
Anon.3769
Anon.1138
Anon.1157
Anon.2751
Anon.3581
Anon.4501
So
ur
ce
 A
S
dstAS : Anon.2354 - srcPort : 123
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
In
co
m
in
g 
Tr
af
fic
 in
 M
B
(b) NTP
Da
y 0
Da
y 5
Da
y 1
0
Da
y 1
5
Da
y 2
0
Da
y 2
5
Da
y 3
0
2020-01-01 - 2020-02-01
Anon.2577
Anon.2591
Anon.2596
Anon.4680
Anon.5148
Anon.3710
Anon.370
Anon.521
Anon.844
Anon.895
Anon.1609
Anon.1959
Anon.1462
Anon.258
Anon.3769
Anon.1138
Anon.1157
Anon.2751
Anon.3581
Anon.4501
So
ur
ce
 A
S
dstAS : Anon.2354 - srcPort : 53
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
In
co
m
in
g 
Tr
af
fic
 in
 M
B
(c) DNS
Da
y 0
Da
y 5
Da
y 1
0
Da
y 1
5
Da
y 2
0
Da
y 2
5
Da
y 3
0
2020-01-01 - 2020-02-01
Anon.2577
Anon.2591
Anon.2596
Anon.4680
Anon.5148
Anon.3710
Anon.370
Anon.521
Anon.844
Anon.895
Anon.1609
Anon.1959
Anon.1462
Anon.258
Anon.3769
Anon.1138
Anon.1157
Anon.2751
Anon.3581
Anon.4501
So
ur
ce
 A
S
dstAS : Anon.2354 - srcPort : 111
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
In
co
m
in
g 
Tr
af
fic
 in
 M
B
(d) SunRPC
Da
y 0
Da
y 5
Da
y 1
0
Da
y 1
5
Da
y 2
0
Da
y 2
5
Da
y 3
0
2020-01-01 - 2020-02-01
Anon.2577
Anon.2591
Anon.2596
Anon.4680
Anon.5148
Anon.3710
Anon.370
Anon.521
Anon.844
Anon.895
Anon.1609
Anon.1959
Anon.1462
Anon.258
Anon.3769
Anon.1138
Anon.1157
Anon.2751
Anon.3581
Anon.4501
So
ur
ce
 A
S
dstAS : Anon.2354 - srcPort : 11211
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
In
co
m
in
g 
Tr
af
fic
 in
 M
B
(e) Memcached
Da
y 0
Da
y 5
Da
y 1
0
Da
y 1
5
Da
y 2
0
Da
y 2
5
Da
y 3
0
2020-01-01 - 2020-02-01
Anon.2577
Anon.2591
Anon.2596
Anon.4680
Anon.5148
Anon.3710
Anon.370
Anon.521
Anon.844
Anon.895
Anon.1609
Anon.1959
Anon.1462
Anon.258
Anon.3769
Anon.1138
Anon.1157
Anon.2751
Anon.3581
Anon.4501
So
ur
ce
 A
S
dstAS : Anon.2354 - srcPort : 19
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
In
co
m
in
g 
Tr
af
fic
 in
 M
B
(f) Chargen
Figure 13: Daily traffic (inMBytes per day) to destination AS Anon.2354 from a set of 20 legitimate ASes not involved in DRDoS attacks.
of historical labeled data for reliable model training, which is often
difficult to collect.
BGP-based mitigation: Past research [41, 42] has developed
BGP-based techniques that an infrastructure operator can use to
mitigate DDoS attacks. These techniques work in the premise that a
network operator has already deployed a tool to detect DDoS attacks.
OnceaDDoSattack is detected then thenetworkoperator can inform
an upstream provider, for example, a higher-tier ISP or an IXP, to
enforce BGP-based rules and redirect the attack traffic away from
the victim network. The techniques are primarily based on: a) BGP
Blackholing, and b) BGP Flowspec rules. [36, 43] offer a detailed
description and measurements of the BGP blackholing technique
that has become popular and is offered as a service at many IXPs.
[17] offers an example application of BGP Flowspec rules. Another
study [44–46] proposes an additional BGP-based technique, called
BGP poisoning, to filter out attack traffic. Our work differs from
these approaches because we focus on designing a detection system
that can be deployed at IXPs to enable the measurement of DRDoS
attack characteristics and that could also be used to enable faster
and more selective attack mitigation.
SDN-basedmitigation:Previousapproacheshaveproposed sys-
tems that leverage the capabilities of Software Defined Networking
(SDN) technologies and Network Functions Virtualization (NFV) to
detect and mitigate DDoS attacks. To overcome BGP-based mitiga-
tion techniques [47, 48], Fayaz et al. [49] propose an OpenDayLight
[50] controller and a network of Virtual Machines (VMs) for in-
creased scalability. The controller is designed to route the traffic
through the VMs to scrub the traffic. Gupta et al. [51–53] and Dietzel
et al. [54] have proposed SDN enabled applications as a network
management solution for IXPs. Our approach is not based on the
SDN andNVF paradigms. Instead, our system can complement these
approaches because it can be deployed on infrastructures that do
not have SDN-based capabilities, and could be adapted to work with
SDN-based traffic routing infrastructure at IXPs to mitigate DRDoS
attacks in a very selective way with low collateral damage.
6 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we studied in-the-wild DRDoS attacks as seen from
a large Internet exchange point (IXP). To enable this study, we first
developed IXmon, an open-source DRDoS detection system specifi-
cally designed for deployment at large IXP-likenetwork connectivity
providers and peering hubs. We then deployed IXmon at Southern
Crossroads (SoX), an IXP-like hub that provides both peering and
upstream Internet connectivity services to more than 20 research
and education (R&E) networks in the South-East United States. In
a period of about 21 months, IXmon detected more than 900 DR-
DoS attacks towards 31 different victim ASes. An analysis of the
real-world DRDoS attacks detected by our system shows that most
DRDoS attacks are short lived, lasting only a fewminutes, but that
large-volume, long-lasting, and highly-distributed attacks against
R&E networks are not uncommon.We then used the results of our
analysis to discuss possible attack mitigation approaches that can
be deployed at the IXP level, before the attack traffic overwhelms
the victim’s network bandwidth.
IXmon: Detecting and Analyzing DRDoS Attacks at Internet Exchange Points
REFERENCES
[1] Min Suk Kang, Soo Bum Lee, and Virgil D. Gligor. The crossfire attack. In
Proceedings of the 2013 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, SP ’13, pages
127–141, Washington, DC, USA, 2013. IEEE Computer Society.
[2] Jason Richards. Denial-of-service: The estonian cyberwar and its implications
for u.s. national security. http://www.iar-gwu.org/node/65.
[3] Jelena Mirkovic and Peter Reiher. A taxonomy of ddos attack and ddos defense
mechanisms. SIGCOMMComput. Commun. Rev., 34(2):39–53, April 2004.
[4] Kyle York. Dyn statement on 10/21/2016 ddos attack. http://dyn.com/blog/dyn-
statement-on-10212016-ddos-attack/.
[5] Matthew Prince. The ddos that knocked spamhaus offline. https:
//blog.cloudflare.com/the-ddos-that-knocked-spamhaus-offline-and-ho/.
[6] Brian Krebs. Krebsonsecurity hit with record ddos. https://krebsonsecurity.com/
2016/09/krebsonsecurity-hit-with-record-ddos/.
[7] Digital Attack Map. Top daily ddos attacks worldwide. http:
//www.digitalattackmap.com.
[8] CloudFlare. Famous ddos attacks learning objectives. https://www.cloudflare.
com/learning/ddos/famous-ddos-attacks/.
[9] Computer Business Review. AWS hit with a record 2.3 tbps ddos attack.
https://www.cbronline.com/news/record-ddos-attack-aws.
[10] Christian Rossow. Amplification Hell: Revisiting Network Protocols for DDoS
Abuse. In Proceedings of the 2014 Network and Distributed System Security (NDSS)
Symposium, February 2014.
[11] CloudFlare. Memcrashed - major amplification attacks from udp port 11211, 2018.
https://blog.cloudflare.com/memcrashed-major-amplification-attacks-from-
port-11211/.
[12] Mina Hao. Ddos attack landscape, 2020. https://nsfocusglobal.com/ddos-attack-
landscape-3/.
[13] CloudFlare. Reflections on reflection (attacks), 2017. https://blog.cloudflare.com/
reflections-on-reflections/.
[14] Cloudflare. How cloudflare’s architecture allows us to scale to stop the largest
attacks. https://blog.cloudflare.com/how-cloudflares-architecture-allows-us-
to-scale-to-stop-the-largest-attacks/.
[15] Akamai. Why akamai cloud security for ddos protection? https://www.akamai.
com/us/en/solutions/products/cloud-security/ddos-protection-service.jsp.
[16] CISCO. Netflow v9. https://www.cisco.com/en/US/technologies/tk648/tk362/
technologies_white_paper09186a00800a3db9.html.
[17] Bgp flowspec. https://archive.nanog.org/sites/default/files/wed.general.
trafficdiversion.serodio.10.pdf.
[18] SoX. Southern crossroads. https://www.sox.net/.
[19] European internet exchange association 2012 report on european ixps.
https://www.euro-ix.net/documents/1117-Euro-IX-IXP-Report-2012-pdf.
[20] W.B. Norton. The Internet Peering Playbook: Connecting to the Core of the Internet.
DrPeering Press, 2011.
[21] Nikolaos Chatzis, Georgios Smaragdakis, Anja Feldmann, and Walter Will-
inger. There is more to ixps than meets the eye. ACM SIGCOMM Computer
Communication Review, 43(5):19–28, 2013.
[22] Philipp Richter, Georgios Smaragdakis, Anja Feldmann, Nikolaos Chatzis, Jan
Boettger, and Walter Willinger. Peering at peerings: On the role of ixp route
servers. In Proceedings of the 2014 Conference on Internet Measurement Conference,
pages 31–44, 2014.
[23] Bernhard Ager, Nikolaos Chatzis, Anja Feldmann, Nadi Sarrar, Steve Uhlig,
and Walter Willinger. Anatomy of a large european ixp. In Proceedings of the
ACM SIGCOMM 2012 conference on Applications, technologies, architectures, and
protocols for computer communication, pages 163–174, 2012.
[24] CISCO. Netflow layer 2 and security monitoring exports. http:
//www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/netflow/configuration/12-
4/nf-12-4-book/nf-lay2-sec-mon-exp.html.
[25] Peter Phaal andMarc Lavine. sflowversion 5. http://sflow.org/sflow_version_5.txt.
[26] US CERT. UDP-based amplification attacks. https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/
TA14-017A.
[27] Routeviews project. http://www.routeviews.org/routeviews/.
[28] Tony Finch. Incremental calculation of weighted mean and variance, 2009.
https://fanf2.user.srcf.net/hermes/doc/antiforgery/stats.pdf.
[29] Pavel Odintsov. Fastnetmon - very fast ddos analyzer with sflow/netflow/mirror
support. https://github.com/pavel-odintsov/fastnetmon.
[30] Matthew Luckie, Bradley Huffaker, Amogh Dhamdhere, Vasileios Giotsas, and
kc claffy. As relationships, customer cones, and validation. In Proceedings of the
2013 Conference on Internet Measurement Conference, IMC âĂŹ13, page 243âĂŞ256,
New York, NY, USA, 2013. Association for Computing Machinery.
[31] CAIDA. As relationships, customer cones, and validation. http:
//data.caida.org/datasets/as-relationships/.
[32] Ip geolocation mappingk. https://ipgeolocation.io/ip-location-api.html.
[33] Fabrice J. Ryba, MatthewOrlinski, MatthiasWÃďhlisch, Christian Rossow, and
Thomas C. Schmidt. Amplification and drdos attack defense – a survey and new
perspectives, 2015.
[34] T. King, C. Dietzel, J. Snijders, G. Doering, and G. Hankins. Blackhole bgp commu-
nity for blackholing. https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-grow-blackholing-00.
[35] Network Startup Resource Center. Remote trigger blackhole filtering
lab. https://nsrc.org/workshops/2019/mnnog1/riso/networking/routing-
security/en/labs/RTBH-local.html.
[36] Vasileios Giotsas, Georgios Smaragdakis, Christoph Dietzel, Philipp Richter, Anja
Feldmann, and Arthur Berger. Inferring bgp blackholing activity in the internet.
In Proceedings of the 2017 Internet Measurement Conference, pages 1–14, 2017.
[37] Job Snijders. Ddos damage control, cheap and effective. https://ripe68.ripe.net/
presentations/176-RIPE68_JSnijders_DDoS_Damage_Control.pdf.
[38] Vyas Sekar, Nick G Duffield, Oliver Spatscheck, Jacobus E van der Merwe, and Hui
Zhang. Lads: Large-scale automated ddos detection system. In USENIX Annual
Technical Conference, General Track, pages 171–184, 2006.
[39] C. Hsieh and T. Chan. Detection ddos attacks based on neural-network using
apache spark. In 2016 International Conference on Applied System Innovation
(ICASI), pages 1–4, 2016.
[40] B. Zhang, T. Zhang, and Z. Yu. Ddos detection and prevention based on artificial
intelligence techniques. In 2017 3rd IEEE International Conference on Computer
and Communications (ICCC), pages 1276–1280, 2017.
[41] Christoph Dietzel, Matthias Wichtlhuber, Georgios Smaragdakis, and Anja
Feldmann. Stellar: network attack mitigation using advanced blackholing.
In Proceedings of the 14th International Conference on emerging Networking
EXperiments and Technologies, pages 152–164, 2018.
[42] Vasileios Giotsas, Georgios Smaragdakis, Christoph Dietzel, Philipp Richter, Anja
Feldmann, and Arthur Berger. Inferring bgp blackholing activity in the internet.
In Proceedings of the 2017 Internet Measurement Conference, pages 1–14, 2017.
[43] Christoph Dietzel, Anja Feldmann, and Thomas King. Blackholing at ixps: On the
effectiveness of ddos mitigation in the wild. In Passive and Active Measurement:
17th International Conference, PAM 2016, Heraklion, Greece, March 31 - April 1,
2016. Proceedings, 2016.
[44] J. M. Smith andM. Schuchard. Routing around congestion: Defeating ddos attacks
and adverse network conditions via reactive bgp routing. In 2018 IEEE Symposium
on Security and Privacy (SP), pages 599–617, 2018.
[45] M. Tran, M. S. Kang, H. Hsiao, W. Chiang, S. Tung, and Y. Wang. On the feasibility
of rerouting-based ddos defenses. In 2019 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
(SP), pages 1169–1184, 2019.
[46] Jared Smith, Kyle Birkeland, Tyler McDaniel, and Max Schuchard. Withdrawing
the bgp re-routing curtain: Understanding the security impact of bgp poisoning
through real-world measurements. 01 2020.
[47] K. Butler, T. R. Farley, P. McDaniel, and J. Rexford. A survey of bgp security issues
and solutions. Proceedings of the IEEE, 98(1):100–122, 2010.
[48] Florian Streibelt, Franziska Lichtblau, Robert Beverly, Anja Feldmann, Cristel
Pelsser, Georgios Smaragdakis, and Randy Bush. Bgp communities: Even more
worms in the routing can. In Proceedings of the Internet Measurement Conference
2018, pages 279–292, 2018.
[49] SeyedK. Fayaz, Yoshiaki Tobioka, Vyas Sekar, andMichael Bailey. Bohatei: Flexible
and elastic ddos defense. In Proceedings of the 24th USENIX Conference on Security
Symposium, SECâĂŹ15, page 817âĂŞ832, USA, 2015. USENIX Association.
[50] Jan Medved, Robert Varga, Anton Tkacik, and Ken Gray. Opendaylight: Towards
a model-driven sdn controller architecture. In Proceeding of IEEE International
Symposium on aWorld of Wireless, Mobile and Multimedia Networks 2014, pages
1–6. IEEE, 2014.
[51] M. Chiesa, C. Dietzel, G. Antichi, M. Bruyere, I. Castro, M. Gusat, T. King, A. W.
Moore, T. D. Nguyen, P. Owezarski, S. Uhlig, and M. Canini. Inter-domain
networking innovation on steroids: empowering ixps with sdn capabilities. IEEE
Communications Magazine, 54(10):102–108, 2016.
[52] Arpit Gupta, Laurent Vanbever, Muhammad Shahbaz, Sean P Donovan, Brandon
Schlinker, Nick Feamster, Jennifer Rexford, Scott Shenker, Russ Clark, and Ethan
Katz-Bassett. Sdx: A software defined internet exchange. ACM SIGCOMM
Computer Communication Review, 44(4):551–562, 2014.
[53] Arpit Gupta, Robert MacDavid, Rudiger Birkner, Marco Canini, Nick Feamster,
Jennifer Rexford, and Laurent Vanbever. An industrial-scale software defined
internet exchange point. In 13th {USENIX} Symposium on Networked Systems
Design and Implementation ({NSDI} 16), pages 1–14, 2016.
[54] ChristophDietzel, GianniAntichi, IgnacioCastro, Eder L Fernandes,MarcoChiesa,
and Daniel Kopp. Sdn-enabled traffic engineering and advanced blackholing at
ixps. In Proceedings of the Symposium on SDN Research, pages 181–182, 2017.
A APPENDIX
Karthika Subramani, Roberto Perdisci, andMaria Konte
3257
10490
4181 174 1299 293 6939 11537 11164
36441 3480 27750 393529 7212 50 19151 3479 40735 29972 10364 12173 3450 3464 2637 6112 10631 2722 40220 40805 22335 13611 396450 3452 11686 3512 12005
Figure 14: SoX’s customers, peers, and providers. Directed (black) edges represent customer-to-provider, whereas undirected (blue) edges
represent peering relationships.
